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Abstract 
 Recent developments in technology, Supreme Court case law, and state legislation 
have created a conundrum of what used to be a somewhat simple application of the law 
regarding privacy rights and the Fourth Amendment. Technology may have outpaced 
jurisprudence in that respect, and thus requires that the Court reevaluate several standards 
and doctrines established through case law. In particular the Court needs to review the 
prudence of the “public accessibility” and “reasonable expectation” standards, as well as the 
necessity of probable cause and search warrants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3	  
	  
Technological advances have occurred at a rapid rate in the past 30 years. 
Televisions, telephones, and cameras have evolved to perform a number of functions, 
enabling society to enjoy a plethora of technological options. For example, the internet has 
enabled scores of individuals to reveal information to the public through various websites, 
such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. These individuals can keep up with family, 
reminisce about high school, or share vacation photos with the use of such sites. Despite this, 
some have argued that, with the increasing sophistication of technology, particularly social 
media, the level of privacy that society possesses is being diminished. While many 
individuals will display photos and stories on websites voluntarily, technology is able to 
collect information from individuals without their knowledge. For example, cell phones are 
able to track an individual’s whereabouts, and the internet is able to provide the address, 
telephone number, and criminal records of selected individuals. With the exciting 
opportunities that advancing technology can provide, it can also bring concerns about how 
much information is disclosed to the public.   
One form of technology that has come under scrutiny is the use of drones, both by the 
government and the public. The development of drones has brought with it the possibility of 
others zooming in through windows from an aerial perspective using camera attachments. 
Recently, drones have become publicly accessible, with the market making them financially 
feasible to obtain. This could be used for various types of surveillance, such as that by 
thieves, stalkers, and kidnappers. Fortunately, simple home security measures can thwart 
many of these things. What is more concerning however, is what can be done when this type 
of surveillance is being used by the police force? And, just as concerning, is it a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment? 
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Case law set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that Fourth Amendment 
issues are anything but settled. In the case Kyllo vs. United States (2001), the U.S. Supreme 
Court created a standard for when technology could be used by the police to search a home 
without a warrant. In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote,  
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
 interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
 "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, "Silverman, constitutes a search--at 
 least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use… (P. 6-
 7). 
However, the Supreme Court left a portion of the doctrine open ended that could 
potentially be used to acknowledge the advances in technology. Also in this opinion Scalia 
stated,   
We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, 
where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior 
of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy 
of advancing technology--including imaging technology that could discern all human 
activity in the home. While the technology used in the present case was relatively 
crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development (P. 7-8) . 
In his opinion, Scalia discussed whether or not the use of sensory enhancing technology is an 
intrusion of privacy; however, technology that is not available to the general public cannot be 
used by the government in a search. Despite this, more and more technology is becoming 
available to the public every day and, at first glance, Kyllo seems to be a case in which 
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technology just happened to outpace jurisprudence. Have technology and the forces of the 
market worked together to make the Kyllo decision null and void? In order to determine the 
constitutionality of a search by drone or other sensory enhancing technology and the validity 
of the “accessible to the general public” doctrine, this paper examines the Fourth Amendment 
and its interpretation in case law. In particular, this paper highlights case law, the impact of 
technology on the Fourth Amendment, and recent changes in state laws that pertain to the 
area of interest.  
What is Privacy? 
 Scholars with different views on the right to privacy both agree that the issue 
revolves around not what someone (the government) knows about an individual, but 
about the how the information was obtained (Thomson, as cited in Marmor, 2015). 
Thomson and Marmor both agree that privacy violations are an extension of property rights 
i.e. the misuse of property or information without the consent of the owner is a violation of 
one’s rights. Marmor, however, views the right to privacy as both a property right and 
something more. According to Marmor (2015), people also have the right to reasonably 
control what information about themselves is presented to the public, and in various ways 
people attempt to express that control. Citizens all across the United States hang blinds and 
curtains in their homes, establish privacy settings on their social media accounts, and 
generally go about their lives revealing only the information that they want to make known. 
In other words, privacy is the ability to decide what personal information an individual wants 
others to know.  
 As technology develops and integrates into widespread public use, it is crucial that 
society keep in mind that simply because information can be accessed, does not mean that it 
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should be. If a person opens his or her blinds for any reason, say to let sunlight in, is that 
person knowingly relinquishing the right to privacy for any information that can be obtained 
through his or her window? This notion becomes crucial when discussing concept of liberty. 
Both ordinary citizens and government have both the capability and the incentive to delve 
into the secret lives of some people, but for government at least, this is restrained by the 
Fourth Amendment and the will of the people. Privacy and liberty go hand in hand; a nation 
that chooses to ignore the desire of citizens to retain some level of taciturnity is not one that 
values freedom. Behavior is altered under surveillance; dissent from the status quo, 
technological creativity, and group/individual anonymity would all be suppressed under a 
nation without sufficient privacy rights. Yes, privacy inspires people to take actions that can 
also be detrimental to society, but the issue goes far beyond that. Most actions taken every 
day are neutral, yet intimate ones, these actions are personal and emotional; the knowledge of 
such information offers no benefit to anyone else, but would result in a personal harm or 
embarrassment. The Fourth Amendment serves to protect these everyday actions, but in order 
to do so, it must by design, shelter some crime for the greater good of society.  
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment 
The Warrant Preference View 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized (U.S. Constitution).  
The wording seems simple, but the text of the Fourth Amendment has been 
interpreted in various ways throughout United States history. Regardless, there are two 
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distinct parts of the Fourth Amendment that are the subjects of this interpretation. The first is 
the “warrant preference” view and the second is the “reasonableness” view, both referring to 
two distinct parts of the Fourth Amendment (Lee, 2011). Until recently, both of these parts 
pertained to mostly physical intrusions (there are a few exceptions), but “technological 
proliferation” has developed in such a manner that the Fourth Amendment will most 
certainly need to be applied in ways that the men who wrote it never imagined would be 
necessary (Lee, 2011).   
The warrant preference portion of the Fourth Amendment indicates that law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. In this phrase, the Fourth 
Amendment is to be read as “no warrants shall issue, based on probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.” This language suggests definitive requirements for a search and seizure; 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted these requirements in different ways, often 
relying on the context of the case at hand.  
In order to understand the warrant requirement one must first define probable cause. 
The Court has stated that probable cause is a very “practical, nontechnical conception” 
(Brinegar v. United States, 1949). The standards for probable cause vary with every 
situation, but Justice Rutledge set the foundation on what every situation must be built upon,  
[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has 
been or is being committed (p. 175-176). 
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All warrants and searches must stem from the belief that a reasonable person would have, 
that a crime either has been or is being committed based on the evidence presented. This 
evidence does not have to meet the same standards that is set within a criminal or civil trial, 
but must be more than mere suspicion and must be based on the “totality of the 
circumstances” (Illinois v. United States, 1983).  
The necessity of a high standard for probable cause was stressed in Beck v. Ohio 
(1964), when it ruled that probable cause acts as a safeguard against discrimination by 
authorities. A police officer therefore, must have some reason to act in a law enforcement 
role. A formerly convicted felon is not to be searched simply because he or she had 
committed a crime in the past any more than the average citizen is to be searched in his or 
her home at random. To do so would be to disregard the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth. It is for that reason that 
the Court has upheld a high standard for searches, to protect citizens from the possible 
discriminatory whims of law enforcement. The precedent for probable cause has become 
crucial with the development of technology as will be discussed later.  
Beyond probable cause the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “supported by 
oath or affirmation” must be approved by a neutral magistrate (Coolidge v New Hampshire, 
1971). The rationale of having a neutral third party approve a warrant is quite clear. There 
would be a conflict of interest if the authority approving a warrant was a member of the law 
enforcement team wanting to conduct the search or was the attorney who desires to prosecute 
the case. A disinterested third party also helps to ensure that sufficient probable cause is met. 
If a magistrate, i.e. “a reasonably prudent man or woman” is convinced that a crime has been 
committed or is being committed then he or she may sign off on a warrant, for the probable 
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cause standard has most likely been satisfied. The failure to gain the approval of a neutral 
magistrate is the equivalent to a warrantless search and thus invalidates the warrant and 
therefore the search and seizure as well. The magistrate therefore acts as barrier between the 
government and citizens. 
… particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized 
 The second distinct objective [of the Fourth Amendment] is that those searches 
deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. The warrant accomplishes this second 
objective by requiring a “particular description” of the things to be searched (Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 1971). The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a deliberate 
prohibition of a general search warrant and provides protections from violations of individual 
rights. General search warrants would allow a police officer to search any area that he or she 
believed a crime to have occurred and even those places where the probability is less likely 
but still possible. The particularity clause requires specification in order to prevent the use of 
general warrants. However the particularity requirement does not have to be so specific to 
specify each room that is to be searched. If an area is connected or used in conjunction with 
the place described in the warrant then it is reasonable for those places to be searched as well 
(Steele v. United States, 1925).  
From physical intrusions to the simulation of an intrusion the Court has ruled on 
multiple occasions that such an act must be sanctioned with a valid warrant based on 
probable cause, signed by a neutral third party, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, as per Fourth Amendment requirement. Much of the reasoning for this comes from 
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the belief that citizens are innocent until proven guilty, and to violate the rights of a suspect 
before his or her conviction is equivalent to violating the rights of an innocent human being. 
The Reasonableness View  
This does not however come without any discrepancies, as few things ever do; the 
Court has set precedent with which they have ruled on the side of law enforcement, cases 
where the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to separate the warrant requirement 
from a search. This reasonableness view breaks down the Fourth Amendment into two 
distinct parts; that a warrant is based on probable cause and that searches be not 
unreasonable, rather than a warrant based on probable cause as prerequisite for a reasonable 
search. Scalia wrote in his majority opinion of Vernonia School District v. Action (1995) that: 
Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the 
obtaining of a judicial warrant… Warrants cannot be issued, of course, without the 
showing of probable cause required by the Warrant Clause. But a warrant is not 
required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a 
warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable 
cause is not invariably required either. A search unsupported by probable cause can 
be constitutional, we have said, “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable” 
(Griffin v. Wisconsin, 1987, p. 873) 
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In order to circumvent the warrant requirement of a search, the search must first and 
always be deemed reasonable. In many instances a warrantless search may be conducted 
under “exigent circumstances” where the opportunity for the destruction of evidence is both 
imminent and likely. An example often cited is that of a stopped car, which when there is 
reason, can be searched due to its mobility and the likelihood that evidence will be either 
hidden or disposed of (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 1971). The doctrine of exigent 
circumstances does not have to be confined to cars however, any case where it is reasonable 
to implement a search without a warrant is valid if the situation can deem it necessary.  
Precedent has required that a reasonable search may also occur when there is a threat 
to maintaining social order and safety. A balancing test must be used in order to determine 
the validity of warrantless searches. Like probable cause every case is different, but when 
conducting a search based on reasonableness the needs of the government or public safety 
must be weighed against the rights of the accused. New Jersey v. T.L.O (1985) and Vernonia 
School District v. Action (1995) tell us that there are times when there is a legitimate 
government interest in maintaining safety and the due process rights of individuals can be 
truncated. If in regards to safety, a search is conducted, and requiring a warrant would be 
overly burdensome or potentially dangerous, then a warrant is not required and therefore 
neither is probable cause, thus the reasoning behind actions like the stop and frisk (Terry v. 
Ohio, 1968).  
The test for a reasonable search is two pronged: “first a search has to be justified at its 
inception, second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
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place,” (New Jersey v T.L.O., 1985). As with probable cause the reasonableness test does not 
require “absolute certainty”, but in contrast, a search solely based on the reasonableness view 
is a lower standard of due process and also conveys a higher risk of potential violation than 
one conducted with a warrant. The safeguards of the reasonableness test are the balancing act 
that must occur and the two pronged test of justification and scope, but a search based on 
reasonableness could be conducted without ever having met them since there is no third party 
involved to stop it. The potential for error here is more real. A violation from a search can 
only be resolved in a reactionary manner via the court system. Whereas a search based on a 
warrant, probable cause, and a magistrate are more preventative measures to search 
violations. However both types of searches have been constitutionally upheld by the Courts, 
due to the varying interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.  
The Right to Privacy: a Development 
The Court has expanded Fourth Amendment protections to any place that an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is to say that an individual is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when he or she is performing an 
action that is not open to public intrusion.  
The Court has adjusted its views on what exactly that expectation of privacy entails. 
In the 1920s the Court ruled that tapping personal phone lines did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. The court adhered to a more textualist approach to the Amendment and 
interpreted it to mean exactly what it says, “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated…” The Court believed that a phone call was the same as projecting a conversation 
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out into the world, and since no physical intrusion is necessary to tap a phone line, it was not 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court placed the burden of protecting intangible 
evidence such as a conversation on the citizens, rather limiting the ability of the government 
to intrude through the expansion of the Fourth Amendment (Olmstead v United States, 1928).  
 This position on the right to privacy was affirmed in a similar case in 1942 when the 
Court ruled that listening to a conversation through the use of a detectaphone was not an 
interception of a private conversation, simply because it merely magnified the volume of the 
sound from its source, which is as nonintrusive as hearing a loud conversation that is going 
on in the same room (Goldman v. United States, 1942). Since neither of these cases were 
considered searches the Fourth Amendment did not apply and therefore neither did its 
requirements for probable cause or reasonableness. 
Now let us consider the right to privacy in which a physical intrusion into a house 
was made without a search warrant but legitimately based on reason. In Warden v. Hayden 
(1967) police entered a residence and seized materials that were used to identify the suspect 
and weapons used during the alleged robbery without a warrant. The Court did not object to 
the validity of the search due to the reasoning that the officers had in searching the particular 
suspect and the exigent and dangerous circumstances surrounding the police conducting it. 
This case publicized the paradigm shift in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment however, 
rather than a protection of property, the Fourth Amendment had come to be seen as 
protection of privacy and the case also invalidated the tangible evidence doctrine for seizures.   
At this point the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to guarantee privacy 
rights to individuals in, for the most part, a more literal sense i.e. homes, papers, etc. But the 
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Court has since then (and it started in Warden v. Hayden, 1967) expanded that right to 
anywhere that an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” This could be a phone 
booth, office, and many other places where one does not expect unwelcomed intrusions by 
others. The Court has also overturned its previously held beliefs that a physical intrusion was 
the only kind of intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. This 
relatively new take on the Fourth Amendment has expanded privacy outside of the home; the 
protection of the Amendment is not property oriented or location focused, it is fixated on the 
privacy of individuals no matter where they are. Any information that is made public is not 
able to be defended under the aegis of the Fourth Amendment even it were done so in the 
home, which has for a long time been regarded as a sacred place of individual privacy. 
Posting something to Facebook or any other social media from the bedroom, or throwing 
incriminating evidence into a trashcan for city pick up would clearly not be subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection any more than would being caught with a handful of drugs in a public 
park be protected. But having a conversation in what was intended and perceived to be as 
private space is protected. Katz used a phone booth; he had a reasonable expectation that his 
conversations would not be overheard, and had technology not been involved the 
incriminating evidence would have never been discovered (Katz v. United States, 1967). This 
decision implies a change in mindset of the Court from when Olmstead and Goldman were 
decided and would mean that an office discussion or a phone conversation at one’s home are 
both expected places of privacy. The search in Katz v. United States (1967) was done so on 
the basis of the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment, there was a strong suspicion 
that a crime was being committed, yet the Court did not uphold the search due to the fact that 
a warrant could have been obtained, validating the search, but was not and therefore it was 
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illegitimate even though authorities had reasonable suspicion; there were no exigent or 
dangerous circumstances in this case so the Court sided with the warrant preference view. 
This reflected the fact that searches based solely on reasonable suspicion are far more likely 
to violate individual rights, while searches made via a warrant based on probable cause with 
the signature of a magistrate acts as a barrier between the accused and the accuser. This and 
the expansion of the right to privacy to any presumed private places have transferred the 
individual protections from searches and seizures from specific places to the individual.  
 These beliefs were also expressed in the ruling of United States v. United States 
District Court (1972). Here another balancing act similar to that in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985) must be exercised, the responsibility of the government to defend itself and the rights 
of individuals are weighed against each other. In this case the Court upheld the warrant 
preference view of the Fourth Amendment again by stating that the warrant requirement is a 
part of the Fourth Amendment and that it should be a necessary part of law enforcement, not 
“dead language that can simply be weighed against the efficiency of the police.” This 
balancing is done by convincing a neutral magistrate that there is sufficient evidence to 
violate someone’s rights. The Court confirmed that the warrant requirement can only be 
violated when there is reason to believe that there are exigent or dangerous circumstances as 
described in previous cases such as Katz, Terry, TLO, etc.  
In Kyllo v United States (2001) it was determined that the tangible goods doctrine 
which was turned down in Warden v. Hayden (1967) did not only apply to conversations. 
The use of thermal imaging technology to detect heat emissions from a home was declared a 
search, because it was information that could not have been obtained without an active 
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inspection of the home with specialized technology. This ruling once again broadened the 
scope as to what is protected under the Fourth Amendment. It was a reaffirmation that the 
Fourth Amendment is a protection of the person’s rights, and is not limited to the property 
that he or she owns, conversations, or physical intrusions. The model of the Court in recent 
years has been an emphasis of the warrant preference view based on the facts of each specific 
case, except in extreme situations where reasonableness is necessary to the safety of the 
parties involved. The implied right to privacy has been expanding incrementally despite a 
few setbacks caused by a disconnect between interpretations of what a search is and the 
ability of informative yet not physically intrusive technology.  
Searches with a Warrant 
In most ordinary situations, a search requires that a warrant be issued. As discussed 
previously a warranted search is one that is based on probable cause, signed by a neutral 
magistrate, and particularly describing the places to be searched. Probable cause being the 
first safeguard for citizens means that the probative value of the evidence, does not have to 
be beyond a reasonable doubt, but must lead a reasonable individual to believe that a crime 
has been or is being committed.  
The search warrant satisfies a higher standard of due process that protects from 
unconstitutional intrusions. Early on in the nation’s history the Court has demanded the use 
of a warrant in searches both physical and sometimes even non-physical in nature (see Boyd 
v. United States, 1886). In 1914 the Court ruled in Weeks v. United States, that evidence 
obtained without a warrant from a person’s home could not be used as evidence in a trial, and 
also concluded that the warrant requirement was not just a portion of the Constitution that 
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could be applied at the convenience of law enforcement; setting a resolute preference for 
obtaining a warrant in most situations. 
These decisions have upheld the warrant requirement in normal circumstances and 
upheld the exclusionary rule as a remedy to violations thereof; precedent has also enforced 
the constitutional conditions that a warrant must meet. See Brinegar v. The United States, 
1949, Illinois v. The United States, 1983, Coolidge v New Hampshire, 1971, and Steele v. 
United States, 1925. It should be mentioned that the Court’s solution of the exclusionary rule 
in Boyd v. United States (1886), Weeks v. United States (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 
against search violations is an example of the strong preference for search warrants. 
There are other concepts however that are more implicit than those of probable cause, 
a neutral magistrate, and particularity. For example the Fourth Amendment states nothing 
about the disclosure of crucial information to magistrates when they are weighing probable 
cause. It merely requires that they be disinterested. Relevant facts such as the use of an 
informant rather than personal observation of a crime have been determined to require full 
disclosure to a magistrate when applying for a warrant (Aguilar v  Texas, 1983). This is not 
the only situation however in which such information would be expressed. The case law 
requires that any “underlying circumstance” which the affiant utilized to draw his or her 
conclusion must be made known in the affidavit for a search warrant. This changes the 
definition of a neutral magistrate, to be both unbiased as well as informed before a search can 
be valid.  
Johnson v United States (1948) further established a state where “police are under the 
law not one where they are the law.” Police officers cannot use there positon of power to 
convince a suspect to allow admittance into a home “under the color of authority.” Even 
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though admittance into the home or other expected places of privacy would then allow the 
officer to reasonably deduce that a crime had been committed and to make an arrest, thus 
allowing for a subsequent search due to incident without ever needing to obtain a warrant. By 
allowing police officers to use their authority to trick or coerce someone into unknowingly 
giving up their rights of Fourth Amendment protections, the very amendment is being 
violated, and the arrest itself would be invalid also nullifying the search that followed. A 
search warrant however, properly obtained, would justify most actions taken. 
Another example of the Fourth Amendment’s silences is in rental property. Seeing 
that the property is owned by one and occupied by another, it is not too outrageous to believe 
that a landlord may allow police to search a home, but according to the ruling in Chapman v. 
United States (1961) that is not the case. The Fourth Amendment offers protections of the 
home from the discretion of police officers (Johnson v. United States, 1948) and landlords, 
unless otherwise agreed to in the rental contract (Chapman v. United States, 1961). Private 
parties are not to be used as a loophole for government enforcement to circumvent the 
protections that the warrant requirement offers.  
 United States v. Ventresca (1965), like Johnson and Chapman, tells us that even in 
questionable cases of probable cause, a search with a warrant is more likely to be upheld than 
one without a warrant. This decision confirmed the warrant preference that had been 
established in previous cases. The deference to this requirement in most situations protects 
from hurried and biased decisions of police officers, it is not a means of stymieing police 
efficiency and is usually the preferred process (Lafave, 2012). 
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The Courts have routinely upheld the requirement of warrants in most situations. It 
would therefore be more practical to say that the Fourth Amendment founded on both the 
literal text requirements and the implied meaning interpreted from case law, requires that 
warrants be based on probable cause, which must be weighed and signed by a neutral and 
well informed magistrate, particularly describing the places to be searched and the things to 
be seized. Every case where there is no threat of exigent circumstances and obtaining a 
warrant would not allow for the covering up of a crime (Aguilar v. Texas, 1983; Johnson v. 
United States 1948; and Chapman v. United States 1961), and in any instances where the 
necessity of a warrant is questionable, a warrant is required (Ventresca v. United States 
1965). The Court made it clear in Johnson that “when the right of privacy must reasonably 
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman 
or government enforcement agent”; reiterating the belief that a warrant obtaining all of the 
above mentioned requirements be sought out in most situations. Since this a rule by which 
enforcement agents must follow, exceptions do exist. Some have already been mentioned 
previously, but the preference for obtaining a valid warrant prior to a search however, is 
strong, usually required, and deeply rooted in precedent.  
Searches without a Warrant 
Not every search requires a warrant, but special circumstances must exist when a 
warrant is not required to perform a legitimate search. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
authorized warrantless searches by police officers on many occasions, and this chapter 
examines some of the more common types of warrantless searches. The cornerstone of 
warrantless searches was founded in 1925 with the Carroll Rule, which requires that probable 
cause be established before conducting a search in the absence of a warrant (Carroll v. 
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United States, 1925). This case involved the search of vehicles and resulted in the Court’s 
statement that the requirements to substantiate a warrantless search are quite similar to the 
requirements that justify the granting of a search warrant. A police officer must have good 
reason to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and also believe that the time it 
would take to obtain a warrant would jeopardize safety or evidence. In other words, it has to 
be believed that if law enforcement had the time to apply for a warrant, the request would 
have been granted. 
Jeopardizing safety or evidence provides law enforcement the authority to conduct 
warrantless searches. These exigent circumstances were articulated in Minnesota v. Olson 
(1990), in which the Court ruled that the following exigent circumstances exist: imminent 
destruction of evidence, hot pursuit of a dangerous offender, public safety, and rescue efforts.  
Due to emergency situations, it is not feasible for police to obtain a warrant; thus, the Court 
has upheld warrantless searches and seizures in these types of circumstances.   
A common type of warrantless search involves searches of automobiles. In Carroll v. 
United States (1925), there was reason to believe that the suspects were participating in 
illegal activity. The suspects were known for distributing alcohol during the prohibition era.  
The police officers could have applied for a warrant; they had enough reasonable suspicion 
that they would have most likely received one. However, under the circumstances, if they 
had applied for a search warrant, the car could have fled the scene, which would have 
allowed the suspects to dispose of the evidence. Other cases similar to Carroll have been 
supported by the Court and have even expanded the authority of police to search every aspect 
of a vehicle as if they actually had a warrant. In United States v. Ross (1982), the Court held 
that, if a police officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is in an automobile, 
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the officer may search “as broad as one that could be authorized by a magistrate issuing a 
warrant.” This was upheld again in California v. Acevedo (1991).   
Another type of warrantless search is a stop and frisk. In Terry v. Ohio (1968), a 
police officer stopped a suspicious person in the street and proceeded to frisk the person 
when he did not respond to police questioning. The Court ruled that, when there is reason to 
suspect someone of a crime, that very reason is also enough to stop an individual for 
questioning. If questioning does not dispel a police officer’s fears, then a frisk of the 
individual can ensue.   
Police officers can also search incident to a lawful arrest. This allows police to search 
an individual for evidence as well as weapons. The only restrictions on this type of 
warrantless search are that it must be contemporaneous to the arrest (at the same time or 
immediately afterward) and that it must be within the wingspan of the detained individual.  
Both of these restrictions ensure that police do not conduct “fishing expeditions” beyond a 
legal arrest (see Chimel v. California, 1969).  
Individuals can consent to a police search as well. As long as an individual gives 
voluntary consent to search, police are able to do so without a warrant. Individuals can 
revoke consent at any time. One of the aspects of consent searches is who has the authority to 
consent to a search. The Court has upheld parents consenting to a search of a child’s room, 
spousal consent, and employer consent. The Court defined this third party consent rule in 
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990).   
The Court has also upheld warrantless searches and seizures in cases involving plain 
view, open fields, and abandonment. With plain view, if police have a right to be where they 
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are, they can seize illegal items that are in plain view. This usually occurs when police are 
executing a search warrant at an individual’s home and find other illegal evidence, not 
included in the warrant, in plain view. These types of searches and seizures are dictated by 
Horton v. California (1990) 
Open fields and abandonment constitute situations in which evidence is found in a 
public place with no obvious possession interest in place. In open fields, these areas are 
accessible to the public and, therefore, police as well. For abandoned property, individuals no 
longer have any privacy interest once their belongings are abandoned. As such, anyone, 
including police, are able to search it (see Hester v. United States, 1924; California v. 
Greenwood, 1988).  
As seen, the U.S. Supreme Court has authorized a number of different types of 
searches by police without a warrant. For these searches, a number of justifications have been 
offered, from public safety to plain view. Regardless of the reasons, it is evident that the 
Court has moved beyond the words of the Fourth Amendment and authorized searches not 
only without a warrant, but also without probable cause. This willingness of the Court to alter 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment provides insight to any possible decisions the 
Court will make about the use of technology in searches and seizures. 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
Katz v. United States (1967) 
Olmstead v. United States (1928) and Goldman v. United States (1942) placed the 
burden of protecting intangible evidence on the citizen. The Court reversed this view of the 
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Fourth Amendment in Silverman v United States (1961), when the Court interpreted Fourth 
Amendment protections to be people oriented, and not tied to any one location, and the Court 
concluded that a violation did not require physical entry into a private space.  
The expansion that Fourth Amendment protections covered not only a person, but 
also intangible evidence related to a person, was reaffirmed in 1967 (Katz v. United States, 
1967). The Katz case is interesting because it very strongly laid out the expectation that law 
enforcement retrieve a warrant before conducting a search. The Court emphasized that, when 
a person believes that he has an expectation of privacy, and when society recognizes that 
expectation, he is, under most circumstances, constitutionally protected: “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (p. 352).  
 In the case of Katz, the phrase “constitutionally protected area” was deemed to be 
misleading, as the Constitution does not protect places, but people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. For Katz, it was the confines of a phone booth where he expected to 
have a private conversation. The FBI positioned a listening device just outside of the phone 
booth, and even took precaution to listen in on only the portions of Katz’s conversations 
pertaining to the crime. The state argued that, since there was no physical intrusion of the 
phone booth, there was no search. In the majority opinion, the Court offered similar 
conclusions that it presented in Silverman (1961) -- if there is reason to believe that a search 
needs to be made, but the necessity of a warrant is even somewhat questionable, then it is 
more prudent to obtain a warrant. Not doing so places the security from searches with the 
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impulses of law enforcement, who may be more emotionally involved than a neutral third 
party, regardless of whether or not a physical intrusion is made.  
A case like Katz begs the question of whether or not sensory enhancing technology is 
an appropriate tool to conduct a search. In most situations employing a listening device does 
not make the police officer’s environment any safer and, in the average search, it does not 
generate any tactical advantage, yet the Court sometimes upholds the use of technology in 
the absence of a warrant if that technology was a substitute for human actions. For Katz, a 
warrant was thought to be necessary, because the technology was evidence capturing, and 
obtained the intimate details of a conversation that could have only been done otherwise with 
a physical intrusion. This requirement does not hold true for some of the following cases; for 
the Court, appropriate technology and warrant requirements tend to operate on separate 
continuums that do not always align.  
Smith v. Maryland (1979) 
 One such case where the warrant requirement and the use of information gathering 
technology do not correlate is Smith v. Maryland (1979). At the request of law enforcement, 
a telephone company installed a pen register, a device to collect the numbers that a customer 
dials, to track the calls of a suspected robber. The question before the Court was whether or 
not the petitioner invoking Fourth Amendment protections had a legitimate claim to privacy 
over the numbers that he was dialing, not just the content of his conversations. As in Katz, 
the warrant requirement revolved around whether or not the petitioner and society believed in 
the same expectation of privacy (Katz v. United States 1967). The second issue revolving 
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around this case was whether or not the pen register data collection was an appropriate use of 
technology. 
 The Court had determined in Katz that the content of one’s speech tends to be a 
private matter; however the contents of speech were not obtained in Smith. The numbers 
dialed were not considered to be a private matter because dialed numbers are turned over to a 
third party - i.e. the telephone company - for billing purposes. Under United States v. Miller 
(1976), Hoffa v. United States (1966), and Lopez v. United States (1963) any information 
turned over to a third party ceases to be private because the parties involved have “assumed 
the risk of disclosure.” 
 The type of technology involved here was frequently used by telephone companies 
regardless of police requests; evidence of this appears in the monthly bill of customers. This 
knowledge that telephone companies collect the numbers dialed using certain technologies 
(i.e. human telephone operators had become obsolete) was common and, thus, any social 
expectation of privacy over the numbers that one dials on a phone were rejected.  
 The issue does not seem to be the technology utilized in this case, but the expectation 
of privacy that one has when the technology is used. In this case, the pen register served as a 
substitute for a human operator, who would have physically collected the phone numbers 
anyway. The expectation of privacy, like technology and warrants, also seems to operate on 
separate continuums: personal expectation of privacy and social acceptance of that 
expectation. The question that must be asked is, which one should outweigh the other? Does 
society’s standard set the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or is it determined by the 
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implied meaning of the Amendment itself? And is there a limit to technological substitutions 
for human activities?  
California v Ciraolo (1986) 
 Another case that appeared before the Court involved aerial surveillance. California v 
Ciraolo (1986) concluded that aerial observations that could be employed by the common 
person was not an unreasonable search; the Court determined that it equates to visual 
observation. The Court reasoned that, if criminal activity can be seen from a publicly 
accessible vantage point, then it did not matter if the crime was located within the curtilage 
of the home, it then becomes plain view, regardless of the motivation of law enforcement.  
 Ciraolo was growing marijuana around his house and constructed a tall fence in order 
to prevent those at ground level from seeing his activity. His intention for privacy at ground 
level did not extend to observance from above. When police were informed that Ciraolo may 
have been growing marijuana they boarded a plane and flew over the property. With no other 
special equipment other than the plane and a camera, the police were able to identify the 
plants as marijuana, and used that as cause to obtain a warrant for his arrest. It did not matter, 
according to the Court, that the intention of the observational flight was a search, rather than 
an inadvertent discovery.  
 As in Katz and Smith, the second question that defines the reasonable expectation of 
privacy was examined. According to the Court, societal expectations of privacy and the 
petitioner’s did not match, thus answering the question of whose expectation carries more 
weight. Ciraolo believed that his property was shielded from public view, and it was from 
ground level, yet the Court determined that it was not, in fact, shielded from view. The Court 
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ruled in favor of law enforcement because simple visual observation is in fact no search even 
if the intended use of the technology is for a search. Relatedly, the Court reasoned that 
Ciraolo’s backyard was accessible to the public via airspace; therefore, police did not 
conduct an unreasonable search since any member of the public could view the backyard 
from the air.   
Dow Chemical Company v. United States (1986) 
 Another example of an aerial search is found in Dow Chemical Company v. United 
States (1986).The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an on-site inspection 
of the Chemical Company without notice and without obtaining an administrative warrant. 
The EPA engaged in aerial photography of Dow’s facilities. Similar to Ciraolo, the Court 
held that, since the technology involved was publicly available, there was no unreasonable 
search and seizure. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment could not be invoked by the Chemical 
Company.  
 The technology involved in this case was a common form of technology often used in 
mapmaking, and any person who had access to a plane and a camera could have replicated 
the images that were taken. This case falls along the same lines as Smith and Ciraolo, and 
confirmed the precedent that if the technology used to conduct a search is easily accessible to 
the general public, then police can use it to conduct a search that does not apply to the Fourth 
Amendment. This implies that no warrant is necessary for a search using common 
technology. This case also implies that law enforcement does not need any statutory 
provision authorizing them to use common technology to conduct their enforcement 
obligations. 
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 The Court did place a possible restriction on the use of technology for surveillance 
purposes. The use of “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to 
the public, such as satellite technology” might require a warrant (p. 239). It appears that the 
Court had adopted the belief that common technology most likely will not provide any 
intimate details that could lead to an invasion of privacy. Again, technology is not the issue; 
it is the level of accessibility that surrounds technology that is the concern of the Court.  
Kyllo v. United States (2001) 
 Public access to technology appears to be the turning point in the previous cases.  
Kyllo v. United States (2001) is an instance where technology that was not available to the 
public was used to search an individual’s home. Law enforcement was informed that Kyllo 
was growing marijuana inside his house and the Department of the Interior (DOI) utilized a 
thermal imager to determine the levels of heat radiating from different areas of the residence. 
Although no intimate details were obtained, just levels of heat, the question is whether or not 
this was a search. The enforcement agents had obtained electric bills and could have 
determined electricity use based on that, which, according to Smith would have been 
acceptable, but the use of a thermal imager without a warrant was deemed unreasonable.  
 In most cases, the warrantless search of a home is going to be struck down by the 
Court; the problem that remains is defining what a search is. Without the use of the thermal 
imager, the DOI would not have been able to determine where the heat was located or how 
constant the levels of heat were, even with the use of electric bills. The Fourth Amendment 
protects citizens from an unreasonable search of a home, and the Court has determined the 
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use of technology that is not easily accessible to the public to be a search, and, therefore, 
struck down the use of the thermal imager without a warrant.  
United States v. Jones (2012) 
 With emerging technology, sometimes law enforcement outpaces the courts when a 
search or seizure is conducted. In United States v. Jones (2012), law enforcement utilized 
GPS technology attached to suspected drug dealer Jones’s car in order to track his 
movements. The Government contended that, because the vehicle that was tracked was in 
plain sight and made use of public roads, the technology that was used was just a substitute 
for visual observation of a place where Jones had no expectation of privacy, like the use of a 
pen register. The government argued that the GPS device was the same as a “tail,” in that the 
government chose to use a more efficient mechanism of tracking Jones instead of employing 
dozens of law enforcement agents to follow him. 
While visual observation and reasonable expectation have been consistently held up by 
the Courts, the Court found that Katz did not confine the Fourth Amendment to places that 
have a reasonable expectation, but merely expanded the protections from “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.” “Effects” are clearly protected by the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment itself and no standard or doctrine can deny or circumvent that protection without 
good reason.  
  The Court struck down the tracking of a vehicle using GPS technology as a substitute 
for visual observation. Whether this was because the technology was too sophisticated or 
because a vehicle is simply never to be followed using tracking technology without a warrant 
is unclear. The one thing that remains constant is that the Court has not clarified the 
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ambiguities of technology as a substitution for physical observation. In Smith, a pen register 
was upheld as a substitution for an operator, and Ciraolo and Dow Jones Chemical Company 
both allowed the use of cameras and an airplane, while warrants were required for Katz, 
Kyllo, and Jones.  
Bigger Issues  
 If an individual’s expectation of privacy is predicated on society’s concurrence about 
that expectation, then, as younger generation’s expectation of privacy wanes, so will an 
individual’s expectation of privacy. The use of social media, the internet, and smart phones 
are all tools that people use every day that may transfer information to the public or to a third 
party without active, informed consent. This is only one small portion of the issue that 
technological proliferation poses. What about other activities that were previously considered 
private by older generations, but are not considered so by younger generations, such as 
travel, at home activities, etc.? Even thermal imaging technology has become available to the 
public; one can be purchased on Amazon for less than $300.00. It appears that Fourth 
Amendment loopholes evolve with time. 
If the Court continues to uphold the visual observation standard as it has thus far, with 
the use of assisting technology that is available to the general public, then, as technology 
which is available to the general public becomes more advanced and sophisticated, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment will dissolve. If Jones confirms that Katz adds to 
Fourth Amendment and common law protections, not limits them, the question then 
becomes, what constitutes a search? If visual observation or the use of common technology is 
not comparable to a search, then what about the use of drones or any other sophisticated 
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technology that becomes available to the public, or any technology that allows both the 
average person or the police to have a more intimate look into a person’s home or office? Is it 
just a substitute for visual observation, like a pair of binoculars or a public vantage point, or 
is it something more? People cannot prevent others from using advancing technology that is 
available to the public, which seemed to have been the one way to prove that a person has an 
expectation of privacy. In light of the technological advancements within reach of the public, 
the Court and legislatures will find it necessary to redefine what a search is.  
Current Issues: Drones 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), originally intended for military use, have now 
expanded to the market for public purchase at stores such as Radio Shack, Walmart, eBay, 
and many other locations. The price ranges from $15.49 for a small Pocket Drone 
Quadcopter (www. bangood.com), which can only fly for five to six minutes, to the xFold 
Dragon X12 RTF U11 Drone, which costs $31,721.82, and is an FAA certified aircraft which 
can carry up to two professional cameras for aerial cinematography (www.adorama.com).  
Drones like the Firestorm Smart Drone can be purchased for merely one-hundred dollars, 
have video recording capabilities, and can even be flown at night (www. virventures.com).  
Court precedent, the increased public accessibility of technology, and the advancing 
capabilities of such equipment create a dilemma for those seeking to strike a balance between 
technology, legitimate searches, and the right to privacy. There are many ways for citizens to 
purchase UAVs, many of which come equipped with cameras and video capturing 
technology. Because drones have become accessible to the public through innovation and 
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economic forces, they now comply with the Court’s stance on what is considered a non-
invasive technology in relation to the Fourth Amendment. 
If “public accessibility”, the “technology as a replacement”, and the “reasonable 
expectation” arguments continue to dominate the legal system, drones that are photo or video 
enabled could potentially be used by police officers without restriction, in a fashion similar to 
aerial traffic surveillance, as could other types of technology. If it is perfectly acceptable to 
use technology as a replacement for a publicly accessible vantage point, then police officers 
could conduct a search of one’s property without it actually being considered a Fourth 
Amendment issue. This, coupled with the fact that societal expectations of privacy seems to 
trump personal expectations (Katz v. United States, 1967),could mean that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy both in one’s home and in the immediate curtilage could vanish, as 
both citizens and law enforcement are allowed to operate a drone over any navigable airspace 
as a means of entertainment or warrantless surveillance, supported by California v. Ciraolo 
(1986), Dow Jones Chemical Company v. United States (1986), and Kyllo v. United States 
(2001).  
Drones, however, offer several new issues that must be discussed. First, they can fly 
at different altitudes than airplanes or helicopters and thus offer glimpses into private 
property that may have been impossible with traditional means of aerial surveillance. What 
then should be considered navigable airspace? Second, drones may be trespassing onto 
private property when flying over various properties. Do property rights extend above the 
surface of the property or is the airspace above surface property a completely separate asset? 
If so, to whom does it belong and can it be purchased like surface and subsurface rights?  
Third, precedent establishes that it is the responsibility of the individual to ensure that he or 
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she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, as concluded in California v. Ciraolo (1986) and 
Dow Chemical Company v. United States (1986). Do these advances in technology and the 
increased potential for fishing expeditions by police officers create an overly burdensome 
expectation on citizens to protect their own privacy? Does the Court need to reexamine the 
rationale behind the decisions in Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Company, and Kyllo? If not, where 
will the erosion of privacy stop? 
Arguments for Warrantless Use of Drones  
In his testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations, Gregory S. 
McNeal, an associate professor of law at Pepperdine University, argued that there should be no 
“blanket, technology centric” approach to legislation regarding the protection of privacy (McNeal 
Testimony, 2013; McGlynn, 2013). He argues that drones are no different than other aircraft, patrol 
cars, or public vantage points, none of which require a warrant based on common law precedent.  
McNeal likens the use of drones to flying an airplane or routine car patrols as a means to obtain the 
probable cause necessary for an arrest or search warrant. 
In his testimony, McNeal argues against the implementation of broadly worded 
statutes restricting drone use from evidence capturing in the absence of a warrant. He states 
that the inadvertent observation of a crime during non-law enforcement operations should be 
protected and admissible in a trial. He discourages both “drone centric” legislation and even 
warrant based approaches to limit drone use, and encourages legislation on surveillance 
transparency, record keeping, and accountability.  
Although not explicitly mentioned in the McNeal testimony, it could be argued that 
drones also offer a variety of other benefits for both law enforcement and taxpayers. Drones 
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are cheaper to operate than a multi-person surveillance operation or other forms of aerial 
observation. They are less likely to be detected by criminals and, thus, increase the level of 
safety for law enforcement.  
McNeal’s testimony implies that drones are simply electronic substitutes for physical 
observation, as seen in Smith v. Maryland (1979) and other subsequent cases. It could also be 
argued that it is highly likely that information obtained via a drone could have also been 
obtained without a warrant through other, more costly means.  
Arguments for “Drone Centric” Warrant Requirements  
Proponents who argue that police officers should always obtain a warrant before 
using a drone posit four main issues: (1) the risk of abuse is high; (2) people become more 
susceptible to privacy breaches; (3) there is currently no legal framework governing drone 
use; (4) public trust in government is low (Eaves, 2013; Stepanovich Testimony, 2012).  
Amie Stepanovich, a member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), 
argues that drone technology is in fact different from other forms of surveillance technology 
because it has the potential for constant monitoring; drones also offer the potential to utilize 
facial recognition software and create an unnecessary database of citizens, regardless of 
whether or not they have committed a crime (McGlynn, 2013; Stepanovich Testimony, 
2012). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), another proponent of drone centric 
warrant requirements, believes that the interconnectedness of drone technology could provide 
for the mass tracking of people by the government and also allow for the inadvertent 
collection of data which could be used in criminal proceedings (ACLU). Because of the low 
cost of operating a drone and the potential for imagery, it could be argued that police would 
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have very little incentive to resist the urge to utilize drones for even low profile cases or more 
worrisome, fishing expeditions. Unrestricted use by law enforcement would come at the cost 
of privacy to citizens, while in comparison, law enforcement would see relatively little cost.  
The ACLU realizes that the stealth nature of drones allows for unnoticed surveillance 
through windows and various other intrusions of privacy (ACLU). Both Stepanovich and the 
ACLU believe that current case law creates a loophole for law enforcement to utilize such 
technology to conduct in what in almost every aspect is a search, but is not considered so 
according to case law. 
Additionally, American trust in government is low. According to a Gallup poll in 
2014, 55% of Americans distrust their government on international or domestic issues 
(Gallup Poll, 2014). With regard to the use of drones by the government, in 2012, Seattle 
Police intended to use drones for routine policing activities; the Seattle Police Department 
had received a grant from the Department of Homeland Security and had purchased the 
UAVs.  However, the council meetings that were held in 2013 to pass ordinances to regulate 
drone use revealed the intense public backlash against the very thought of police officers 
utilizing drones and the city had to abandon the idea (McGlynn 2013; The Seattle Times 
2013). A poll by Monmouth University in 2012 revealed that, while “80% of Americans 
support the use of drones in search and rescue operations, 67% support drone use for tracking 
criminals, and 64% support searching for illegal immigrants via drone technology,” 
Americans do not support the use of drones for issues such as traffic violations. In fact, “67% 
of Americans oppose drone use in such a constant manner. Sixty four percent of the 
population is either very concerned or somewhat concerned about the drone-privacy dilemma 
and only 15% of Americans are not concerned at all about the potential for diminishing 
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privacy rights should law enforcement begin using UAV’s on a regular basis” (Murray, 
2012).  
FAA Regulations Regarding Drones 
 The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Subtitle B, tasked the FAA with 
piloting a program to implement drone use into U.S. airways, issue guidance for the 
operation of public drones, and establish a drone authorization process by December 31, 
2015. This Act was carried out and dictates that the FAA plan for the use of drones to 
promote public safety, but stops short of providing any substantial privacy protections from 
government agencies. Although the FAA grants the authority to use drones – known as 
Certificates of Authorization (COA) -- it cannot, however, regulate how law enforcement 
may use drones in pursuit of criminal activity (Galizio, 2015).  
 To be in compliance with the law, the FAA has proposed regulations for drone use. If 
the FAA passes these regulations, then drones used on the domestic front must weigh less 
than fifty five pounds, may only operate within daylight hours and within sight of the 
operator, must fly less than or equal to 500 feet above ground level, must not exceed 100 
mph, must be operated by someone who is both at least seventeen years of age, has passed 
the FAA knowledge test, and must have their drone registered with the FAA (NCSL, 2016) 
Notable State Legislation Regarding Drones 
Twenty states have passed legislation concerning drones, while five other states have 
adopted resolutions related to drones (NCSL, 2016). Many of the states that have enacted 
legislation regulating how public agencies may use drones in day to day activities require that 
police must obtain a warrant prior to utilizing the technology. Most of these states do allow 
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for exceptions to the drone specific warrant requirement for reasonable suspicion 
accompanied with exigent circumstances, danger to the life of an individual, search and 
rescue missions, terrorist threats, regulatory activities for industry compliance, mapping and 
GIS duties, etc.  
Florida 
Florida state statute Title XLVII Chapter 934.50 regulates state searches and seizures 
using drone technology. This act, commonly known as the “Freedom from Unwarranted 
Surveillance Act,” prohibits the use of drones by law enforcement agencies to gather 
evidence or other information. The statute also prevents private and public drones from 
collecting images of privately owned real property or of the person living at such property 
“with the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual or property captured in the image.”  
What makes this statute unique is that it also explicitly defines a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in regards to drone use: “[A person] on his or her privately owned real 
property if he or she is not observable by persons located at ground level in a place where 
they have a legal right to be, regardless of whether he or she is observable from the air with 
the use of a drone.” This is unique, as it legally identifies a difference between two types of 
aerial surveillance – drone surveillance and traditional aerial surveillance.  
Illinois 
Illinois Public Act 098-0569 is a notable piece of drone legislation because it created 
an Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (UAS) Oversight Task Force, which is designed to study 
and make recommendations for the “operation, regulation, and usage of drone technology.” 
The task force is appointed by the Governor and must represent twenty two stakeholders, 
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some of which include the Division of Aeronautics, the State Police Department, the 
Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, The Department of 
Commerce and Economic Opportunity, and a representative from the Attorney General’s 
Office. The job of the task force is to create rules and regulations regarding both public and 
private use of drones within the state; it also receives support from the Department of 
Transportation. The task force, however, is set to expire in September of 2016. 
Nevada 
Nevada Assembly Bill 239 establishes limitations on the use of drones by law 
enforcement and other public agencies and requires the creation of a statewide registry for all 
drones operated by the public sector, but only to the extent that funding is available. The law 
also requires that certain information relating to government use of drones be provided to the 
state legislature and requires that the Department of Public Safety regulate legal purposes and 
use of drones along with civil and criminal penalties for any violations thereof.  
Utah 
Utah House Bill 296 necessitates testing requirements for a law enforcement agency's 
use of an unmanned aircraft system and also implements law enforcement UAV annual 
reporting requirements for the number of times a UAV was operated by a law enforcement 
agency, the number of times a drone aided in a criminal investigation, a description of how 
the UAV was helpful in each situation, the type of data collected, data collected by non-law 
enforcement persons, and the total cost of drone operations each year.  
The training section of Utah House Bill 296 does not pertain to education on the 
ethics of drone use, when it is appropriate to operate a drone with and without a warrant, or 
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any other sort of decision making exercises, but only refers to training on how to physically 
operate a drone.  
Case Law Regarding Domestic Drone Use 
In 2012, a North Dakota district court convicted a man of terrorizing, preventing 
arrest, and failing to comply with the law for stray animals. Police officers arrested Rodney 
Brossart on his own property after obtaining a warrant to launch a predator drone in order to 
identify his exact location (Koebler, 2012; State v. Brossart, 2015). It has been said that this 
is the first case where, within the borders of the United States, law enforcement has used 
unmanned aerial surveillance in order to locate and convict a suspect.  
According to Koebler (2012), local law enforcement received approval from a 
magistrate and the Department of Homeland Security to operate the predator drone, and this 
was upheld by the trial court and never mentioned in any of the appellate cases that followed. 
Brossart never brought a challenge to the use of a drone before the appellate court, most 
likely for two reasons. First, a warrant was obtained on probable cause before the drone was 
used. Law enforcement knew that Brossart was illegally keeping cattle that did not belong to 
him, he had made legitimate threats against law enforcement, and had been involved in a 
sixteen hour standoff with the police (Koebler 2012). Second, Brossart never petitioned the 
appellate court to overturn the trial court’s ruling for an invasion of privacy via drone use; 
therefore, the appellate court could not make a ruling on the legality of domestic drone use. It 
should be noted that, even if he had, precedent may not have worked in his favor anyway.  
This case is important, however, in setting a precedent of its own. Should other courts 
lean on this decision for future cases, then law enforcement will be able to operate drones in 
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pursuit of criminal activity. However, other courts may only allow for such tactics under the 
threat of terrorism, or although less likely, rule against drone use altogether as being too 
invasive.  
Argument 
This ambiguity created by the gaps in case law and the lack of legislation means that 
current safeguards are not adequate to ensure privacy, which has resulted in calls for 
Congress and state legislatures to establish surveillance protections. The FAA was instructed 
to create a plan for integrating the use of both private and government drones safely into U.S. 
airspace by 2015, but there has been no successful federal movement to regulate how drones 
may be utilized by government agencies. Therefore, either Congress, state legislatures, or the 
courts need to make the decision to restrict the use of drone technology for law enforcement 
purposes.  
International Association of Chiefs of Police 
In 2012, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) issued guidelines 
for the use of UAVs by law enforcement. Some of their suggestions included accountability 
requirements, public engagement and notification of intended drone use, and warrant 
requirements in the pursuit of criminal activity that create intrusions on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy (IACP, 2012).  
The IACP understands both the costs and the benefits that UAVs offer for law 
enforcement agencies and has suggested striking a balance between the two. Their 
recommendations conflict with the arguments made in the McNeal testimony and fall more 
along the lines of various state legislation that has been passed in recent years. 
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 The fact that these recommendations were made by an organization comprised of law 
enforcement personnel, suggesting regulations on themselves, causes it to carry more weight 
in the argument for drone regulations than McNeal’s argument against it. By recommending 
warrant requirements, training, transparency, and other accountability measures, the IACP is 
stating that regulations on drone use would not hinder the ability of law enforcement agents 
to do their job, but safely advance it. Their recommendations also seem to suggest that even 
law enforcement sees a distinct difference in privacy risks of Unmanned Aerial Surveillance 
and surveillance by airplanes, helicopters, or patrol cars.  
Basis in Legislation  
Twenty states have adopted drone limiting legislation and five have adopted 
resolutions. As other states consider whether or not to impose some form of regulation, the 
issue will have to also come before Congress in order to eliminate the bifurcation between 
what state police and federal law enforcement would be able to do. In order to formulate both 
federal policy and state policy, it would be beneficial to consider both the IACP’s guidelines 
and a combination of the crucial portions of existing state statutes regarding drone 
regulations.  
In Olmstead v. United States (1928) it was recommended in the majority opinion of  
the Court that if there was strong support for a protection from invasive actions, then it was 
up to the legislative bodies to enact legislation that would do so. It is important however, that 
any suggestion for federal legislation regarding public drone use should combine the key 
elements of state legislation. Legislators should consider a warrant requirement for drone 
searches, as well as define a baseline of what a reasonable expectation of privacy is. Any 
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possible legislation should allow for exceptions to the warrant requirement for risks of 
terrorism, exigent circumstances, routine government functions, and search and rescue 
missions. Future legislation should also include the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
in a criminal trial as well as timeline for the destruction of personal information that is 
obtained. It would also be practical to allow for remedies for the violation of drone 
legislation and require mandatory training for drone operators, the establishment of an 
oversight board, and a protocol for the transparent recordkeeping of drone operations. These 
elements would, for the most part, secure the privacy interest of citizens without inhibiting 
the effectiveness of governmental operations.   
The states have often been called the laboratories of democracy and they are speaking 
with a growing voice. The states reflect both the will of the people and, according to Katz v. 
United States (1967), the will of the people determines what society sees as a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The above proposal pulls key aspects of various state statutes and 
from the guidelines set by the International Board of Police Chiefs which reflect not only the 
growing opinion of citizens, but of the decision makers in law enforcement as well.  
Basis in Case Law  
Although Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Company tend to point the Court in a pro drone 
direction, cases like Katz and Jones pull the Court towards a more controlled-use view of 
technology. While some argue that drone technology is merely another vantage point from 
which law enforcement may legally obtain information, others argue that technology has 
surpassed jurisprudence and, as in both Katz v. United States (1967) and United States v. 
Jones (2012) demand a valid warrant prior to utilization.  
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In Katz v. United States (1967), the state attempted to argue that placing a listening 
device outside of the phone booth did not violate the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. 
First, it was not a physical entry; however, in Silverman v. United States (1961), the Court 
determined that a physical intrusion was not necessary for an action to be considered a 
search. Second, the state argued that there was no actual seizure of evidence, merely sound 
waves, but the Court ruled in Warden v. Hayden (1967) that evidence is not always tangible. 
In a similar fashion, UAVs obtain information without a physical entry and that which is not 
tangible, but still possibly incriminating, but most importantly can be utilized without the 
requirement for probable cause.  
In United States v. Jones (2012), the Court examined GPS technology. Similar to 
drone technology, GPS technology is readily available to the public. Yet, when law 
enforcement in the District of Columbia placed a tracking device on Jones’s car, it was 
determined to be an unconstitutional search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
Jones’s vehicle traveled on public streets, which could have been followed by a patrol car or 
a helicopter, but law enforcement agents decided to utilize technology as a human 
replacement. A tracking device requires less manpower and money than undercover 
operations or helicopter surveillance, as does drone technology, but the Supreme Court struck 
down the employment of the tracking device without prior obtainment of a warrant. This is 
based on the Court’s reasoning for the ruling in Kyllo v. United States (2001), through which 
it established that when technology offers insight that could not have otherwise been 
obtained without a physical intrusion or the use of that technology, such an action is 
considered a search.  
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The Court determined that the employment of a GPS device violated the common- 
law trespassory test, which prohibits the government from obtaining information without a 
warrant from any of the items listed in the text of the Fourth Amendment: “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.” The Court in a sense placed the Katz reasonable expectation standard on 
the back burner and brought the more textualist standard to the forefront. Rather than 
explicitly choosing one over the other, the Court has augmented the common law trespassory 
test with the Katz reasonable expectation standard. According to the Court, the two do not 
mitigate each other (United States v. Jones 2012). Therefore, any information obtained 
without a warrant from a person’s home, papers, or effects that was intended to be kept 
private, through the use of a drone would violate both common law and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. Drone technology is in fact comparable to the circumstances 
surrounding U.S. v. Jones (2012) because like UAVs, a GPS tracking device can also be 
bought both online and in stores, some for less than one hundred dollars (www.amazon.com).  
As mentioned drone technology is not so different from the GPS technology used in 
United States v. Jones (2012) or even the listening device used in Katz v. United States 
(1967), except for the fact that more intimate details may be obtained through the use of 
sophisticated drone technology than from a global positioning system or even a listening 
device. Not only does the advent of drone technology offer the potential to look into the more 
intimate details of a person’s life, it can travel in the airspace above privately owned 
property, which the Court has mentioned can, at times, violate one’s rights. This differs from 
ordinary public vantage points, as they do not ordinarily affect one’s use of his or her 
property nor do they traverse an individual’s property. Fences can be constructed, covers, and 
other structures can all be used to conceal activity from ground level or from a distance. 
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Drones offer the capability to close that distance from an aerial perspective. Navigable 
airspace is considered to be a public highway (United States v. Causby, 1946), but that 
considered the flight altitudes of airplanes, which only come close to private property during 
landing or takeoff. The airspace directly above a person’s property, navigable by drones, can 
directly affect the use of that property. Under United States v. Causby (1946) any flights over 
private land that are low and frequent that create an interference with enjoyment and use are 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendments “Takings Clause”. Drones even offer the 
capability to fly lower than ordinary surveillance aircraft, as per FAA regulations, which 
allows them to fly any vertical distance below 500 feet.  
 Furthermore, unlike ordinary ground or aerial surveillance from an airplane, citizens 
have relatively few ways to protect their private property or the intimate details of their lives 
from the image capturing capabilities of a drone. It would place an unfair burden on the 
people to require them to protect their privacy from every observable angle due to an 
advance in technology. It was determined in Rios v. United States (1960) that, when evidence 
which is intended to be private, even though it is publicly accessible, is obtained without a 
warrant, arrest, or special circumstances, then that action constitutes a search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment (Rios v. United States, 1960, as cited in Katz v. United States, 
1961). Evidence that could be obtained on a person’s private property or within their 
dwelling should assume the characteristics of private intensions, unless it can be obtained 
without sensory enhancing technology (United States v. Jones, 2012). It is for those reasons 
that the Court should be inclined to strike down any unrestricted use of drone technology in 
search of private property.  
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 The Court has a long history of precedent that supports the need to reevaluate the 
meaning of the reasonable expectation standard for the right to privacy and the need for 
probable cause, especially in regards to progressing technology in a general sense. In 
Silverman, Katz, and Kyllo the Court concluded and reaffirmed the fact that a physical entry 
is not required in order to conduct a search. Additionally, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 
(1971), the Court determined that searches should be as limited as possible and that the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prohibit the ability of government to participate in 
general searches, something that developments in technology and recent court cases like 
Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Company, and, to an extent, Kyllo, seem to contradict. The rulings in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) and Vernonia School District (1995) tells us that there is a two 
pronged test that is to be used when considering the validity of a search; the first of which is 
that a search has to be justified at its inception. Therefore, the use of drones or similar sense 
enhancing technology without a warrant is likely to fail this first test of reasonableness if it is 
construed as a general search. This of course only applies to private property, public lands 
are and should be susceptible to general surveillance searches, unless there is an expectation 
of privacy such as a phone booth.  
 Kyllo v. United States (2001) provides the argument that any information that is 
gained that otherwise could not have been obtained without an intrusion is also an invasion 
of privacy. Furthermore, Ventresca, Johnson, and Chapman all suggest that, in any situation 
where the necessity of a warrant is questionable, it is more sensible to obtain a warrant as a 
means of preserving the rights of citizens over the difficulties that it places on law 
enforcement. Therefore, any ambiguity caused by the current reasonableness standard should 
be safeguarded by Fourth Amendment search protections.  
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 In U.S. v. Jones (2012), the Court augmented the common law privacy protections of 
the Fourth Amendment with the Katz reasonable expectation protections, stating very clearly 
that the two are not to be interpreted as competing views. It was also interpreted in Beck v. 
Ohio (1964), as well as various other cases, that the Fourth Amendment restrictions on 
government searches are to protect the citizens from the whims and swift actions of law 
enforcement (see Silverman v. United States 1961; Coolidge v. New Hampshire 1971). In the 
event that the rights of the citizen must yield to the necessity of a search, the result of 
Johnson v. United States (1948) and other case law requires that such governmental action be 
taken through the procurement of a warrant approved by a neutral third party.   
 Precedent speaks volumes and it is crucial when debating the necessity of a warrant 
for searches in the advent of both technological proliferation and evaporating individual 
privacy, but it is also important to remember that state legislatures, acting as the voice of the 
people, are passing laws in growing numbers that protect citizens from the potential for 
governmental overreach through the use of drone technology; these laws also happen to be 
congruent with the beliefs set out by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The 
growing pressure from the people, in the form of their duly elected representatives, and 
acceptance by law enforcement should be noted by both the Congress and the United States 
Supreme Court in the near future when determining the direction that the nation will take 
regarding the right to privacy.  
  Preemptive actions to protect privacy would require state and federal legislatures to 
enact law that do so, but there has been a rise in partisanship and legislative inaction. 
Therefore, I suggest that the Court strongly consider acting in a reactionary manner, should 
the situation present itself, to reevaluate the precedent set by cases such as Ciraolo, to 
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reestablish the necessity of probable cause for searches of private property, and to strengthen 
the deference for a warrant prior to searches of private property in the absence of exigent 
circumstances.   
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